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This paper documents an increase in the volatility of output at the firm level in the United 
Kingdom, in keeping with recent research for the United States.  Evidence at the sectoral level 
suggests that this may have arisen as a result of increased product market competition. This 
greater volatility at the firm level has also occurred at a time of greater macroeconomic stability, 
commonly referred to as the ‘Great Stability’.  National accounts data for 31 sectors in the 
economy show that the fall in aggregate volatility is mostly a result of lower covariance between 
sectors rather than individual sectors becoming less volatile.  This suggests a possible role for 




Over the past decade, the United Kingdom has witnessed a sharp decline in the volatility of 
output growth and inflation — dubbed the Great Stability.   Between 1960 and 1992 the standard 
deviations of annual GDP growth and inflation in the United Kingdom were 2.2 per cent and 5.5 
per cent.  Since 1993 these standard deviations have fallen to 0.7 per cent and 0.8 per cent 
respectively. This phenomenon has also occurred in many other industrial economies, particularly 
the US, leading to a debate as to whether the improvement has been brought about by structural 
change, better monetary policy (‘good policy’), or by smaller shocks hitting the economy, (‘good 
luck’).  Understanding the causes of the Great Stability is clearly important for policy going 
forward but as yet there is little agreement as to the reasons behind the better macroeconomic 
climate.   
To date, the majority of analysis on the Great Stability has been based on aggregate data.   
Despite this, many of the conclusions have relied on assumptions of behaviour at the 
microeconomic level.  Recent research has drawn attention to an increase in firm–level sales 
volatility in the United States concurrent with the reduction in aggregate volatility.  This 
increasing trend is found to be independent of the age, size or sector the firm operates in. The 
reduction in aggregate volatility is also found to be driven principally by a fall in the correlation 
between the growth rates of sectors, rather than a fall in the volatility of the sectors themselves.   
This paper uses individual firm accounts from Thomson Financial Datastream to investigate 
whether firm–level volatility in the UK has followed a similar trend to that in the United States.  
It studies the results from two separate panels of data — one using the result from all firms where 
data are available, the second using a balanced panel of firms where data are available in each 
year throughout the sample period.  Investigating the growth of real sales, it finds supporting 
evidence for an increasing trend in firm–level volatility in the UK over the period 1974–2004.  
This increase in volatility is found to accompany a widening of the distribution of firms’ sales 
growth volatility both over time and cross–sectionally.  These results hold even when firm–
specific factors, including size and age, are taken into account. 
We then divide the sample into nine broad industrial sectors.  Within these sectors there is found 
to be an increase in volatility of the median firm.  Over the same period, the covariance between 
the growth rate of sales of firms within sectors was found to decrease, resulting in a lowering of 
the volatility of sales growth at the sectoral level.  Taking this analysis to a more aggregate level, 
the variance of total value added is decomposed, using data from UK national accounts, into the 
variance of the individual sectors and the covariance between sectoral growth rates.  The main 
driver in the fall in aggregate variance is found to be the fall in covariance between sectors rather 
than the fall in the variance of sector growth.   
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Understanding the reasons behind the divergence in trends at aggregate and at micro–level may 
be crucial in discriminating between different hypotheses of the cause of the Great Stability.   The 
results presented in this paper suggest that there is a role for structural change in the reduction of 
aggregate volatility.  In particular, increased competition in product markets, possibly through 
deregulation or globalisation, may have changed firms’ price–setting behaviour which may have 




Over the past decade, the United Kingdom has witnessed a sharp decline in the volatility of 
output growth and inflation — dubbed the Great Stability.  In the words of Benati (2006):    
The post–1992 inflation–targeting regime appears to have been characterised, to date, by the 
most stable macroeconomic environment in recorded UK history. Since 1992, the volatilities of 
the business–cycle components of real GDP, national accounts aggregates, and inflation measures 
have been, post–1992, systematically lower than for any of the pre–1992 monetary regimes or 
historical periods…. The comparison with the period between the floating of the pound vis–à–vis 
the US dollar (June 1972) and the introduction of inflation targeting (October 1992) is especially 
striking, with the standard deviations of the business–cycle components of real GDP and inflation 
having fallen by about 50 and 70 per cent, respectively. 
 
This phenomenon has also occurred in many other industrial economies, particularly the US, 
leading to a debate as to whether the improvement has been brought about by structural change, 
better monetary policy (‘good policy’), or by smaller shocks hitting the economy, (‘good luck’).  
Understanding the causes of the Great Stability is clearly important for policy going forward but 
as yet there is little agreement as to the reasons behind the better macroeconomic climate.   
To date, the majority of analysis on the Great Stability has been based on aggregate data.   
Despite this, many of the conclusions have relied on assumptions of behaviour at the 
microeconomic level.  Recent research (e.g. Comin and Mulani (2004)) has drawn attention to an 
increase in firm–level sales volatility in the United States concurrent with the reduction in 
aggregate volatility.  This increasing trend is found to be independent of the age, size or sector 
the firm operates in.  Comin and Philippon (2005) also find that the reduction in aggregate 
volatility is driven principally be a fall in the correlation between the growth rates of sectors, 
rather than a fall in the volatility of the sectors themselves.   
This paper uses individual firm accounts from Thomson Financial Datastream to investigate 
whether firm–level volatility in the UK has followed a similar trend to that in the United States.  
Investigating the growth of real sales, it finds supporting evidence for an increasing trend in firm–
level volatility in the UK over the period 1974–2004.  This increase in volatility is found to 
accompany a widening of the distribution of firms’ sales growth volatility both over time and 
cross–sectionally.  These results hold even when firm–specific factors, including size and age, are 
taken into account.  As a further robustness check, a balanced panel of all 158 firms that report 
accounts in every year of the sample is analysed.  The upward trend in firm–level volatility is 
found to hold, confirming that it is not an artefact of changing sample composition. 
We then divide the sample into nine broad industrial sectors.  Within these sectors there is found 
to be an increase in volatility of the median firm.  Over the same period, the covariance between 
the growth rate of sales of firms within sectors is found to decrease, resulting in a lowering of the 
volatility of sales growth at the sectoral level.  Taking this analysis to a more aggregate level, the 
variance of total value added is decomposed using data from UK national accounts for 31 sectors.    
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This divides the variance of aggregate value added into the variance of the individual sectors and 
the covariance between sectoral growth rates.  The main driver in the fall in aggregate variance is 
found to be the fall in covariance between sectors rather than the fall in the variance of sector 
growth. 
Understanding the reasons behind the divergence in trends at aggregate and at micro–level may 
be key in discriminating between different hypotheses of the cause of the Great Stability.   The 
results presented in this paper suggest that there is a role for structural change in the reduction of 
aggregate volatility.  In particular, increased competition in product markets, possibly through 
deregulation or globalisation, may have changed firms’ price–setting behaviour which may have 
led to greater flexibility and a better absorption of shocks.  These findings provide some 
additional insights to the burgeoning literature on the Great Stability, which for the most part has 
concentrated on the debate between ‘good policy’ and ‘good luck’.  The analysis here is unable to 
differentiate ex post between smaller aggregate shocks and improved policy better able to 
counteract aggregate shocks. 
This paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 reviews some of the literature on trends in 
aggregate and firm–level volatility.  Section 3 sets out the methodology and firm–level data used 
in the paper.  Section 4 presents the results from the firm level data.  Section 5 studies sectoral 
effects in the firm–level data.  Section 6 undertakes a decomposition of aggregate GDP growth 
using sectoral data from national accounts.  Section 7 reviews the results of the data analysis, and 
how this may help discriminate between differing explanations of the Great Stability.  Section 8 
concludes. 
2 Previous literature on aggregate and firm–level volatility 
The decline in aggregate volatility worldwide is well documented, and the subject of a large 
literature.  Stock and Watson (2002) note that the standard deviation of annual growth rates of US 
GDP was 2.7% over the period 1960–1983, but only 1.6% from 1984–2001.  They attribute 20–
30% of this decline in volatility to better monetary policy by the Federal Reserve, 20–30% to 
identifiable ‘good luck’ in the form of smaller shocks, and 40–60% to other unknown forms of 
‘good luck’ which lead to smaller forecast errors.  Canova and Gambetti (2004) use a structural 
VAR to assess the impact of monetary policy in the United States.  They find that the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism has changed little over the past 25 years and that the 
improvement vis–à–vis the 1970s is a result of smaller shocks — or ‘bad luck’ in the 1970s. 
Benati (2006) looks at output and inflation data for the UK under different monetary regimes. 
Starting in 1662 with the de facto silver standard he charts the course of macroeconomic 
volatility over the course of three and a half centuries. He finds that the post–1992 period has to 
date been characterised by the most stable macroeconomic environment in recorded UK 
economic history.   
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Cecchetti et al. (2004) investigate the causes of the fall in output volatility across 24 countries 
over the period 1983–1998.  Acknowledging the existence of a trade–off between output and 
inflation volatility, Cecchetti et al. recognise this improvement could be a result of better 
monetary policy or a reduction in the prevalence and amplitude of supply shocks.  They find that 
monetary policy became more efficient in 21 out of the 24 countries, including the UK and US.  
Furthermore, in 20 out of the 21 countries that experienced more stable macroeconomic 
conditions, better monetary policy accounted for over 80% of the measured gain.  However, they 
also concede that the improvement in monetary policy will have benefited from supply–side 
policies in the goods and labour market.  Their method is unable to distinguish between these 
policies and other supply–side shocks.  They also note that were they to focus merely on output 
volatility, as opposed to the combination of output and inflation, then the role played by 
policymakers in reducing volatility is much lower. 
Another explanation given in the literature for the reduction in aggregate volatility (e.g.  
McConnell and Perez–Quiros (2000)) is that new production techniques at firms, such as just–in–
time, enable them to manage better their inventories, reducing the level of output volatility at the 
firm level, and consequently at the aggregate level.   
However, Comin and Mulani (CM) (2004) show that the decline in aggregate volatility has been 
matched by an increase in firm–level volatility of real sales in the United States over the period 
1950–2002.  They undertake several tests on a panel of firm–level data drawn from the 
COMPUSTAT database of accounts of listed US companies.  They find that this increase in 
volatility at the firm level is widespread, and not a function of the age of the firm, or the sector in 
which it operates. 
Comin and Philippon (CP) (2005) further investigate the divergence in trends between aggregate 
and firm–level volatility.  Using a panel of 28 OECD countries, including the United Kingdom, 
they find a common thread of a negative correlation between volatility at the firm level and at the 
aggregate level.  Furthermore, firm–level volatility appears to increase after deregulation in the 
goods market.  They find an increase in the turnover of market leaders (measured in terms of 
operating income or market value), suggesting an increase in product market competition. 
In a comment on CP (2005), Eberly (2005) draws attention to how their results change when 
studied at a shorter time horizon.  When the firm–level volatility is calculated at the five–year 
rather than the ten–year horizon, the upwards trend in volatility is less discernable.  Indeed, the 
data appear to show an increase in volatility over the early 1990s which subsequently tails off.  
Eberly (2005) consequently questions whether the rise in firm–level volatility is best described as 
an increasing trend, or merely an episode of higher volatility.   
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Evidence from employment data also suggests that there may be some compositional biases in CP 
(2005)’s work.  Using a large panel of both listed and unlisted firms, Davis et al. (2006) find that 
the volatility of firm–level volatility has fallen in the United States since 1976.  This is attributed 
to the fall in employment volatility of unlisted firms which dominates the increase in employment 
volatility of listed firms found by CP (2005).   
CP (2005) also decompose the aggregate volatility into the average volatility of sectors and the 
correlation between the growth rates of individual sectors.  They find that the decline in aggregate 
volatility is mostly a result of the decline in correlation between sectors.  This result is supported 
by Irvine and Schuh (2005) who find that 80 per cent of the reduction of the variance of goods 
output growth is attributable to the reductions in the covariance among 2–digit and 3–digit SIC 
industries.  Using a ‘heterogeneous–agent’ VAR
(1), which explicitly parameterises the dynamic 
structural relationship between industries as well as the structural relationships between aggregate 
variables, Irvine and Schuh find evidence that the reduction in aggregate volatility can be 
attributed principally to changes in the structure of the economy, rather than a reduction in 
aggregate shocks.  In particular they find a role for reduced correlation between sales and 
inventory investment. 
3 Methodology and data 
This paper creates a measure for firm–level volatility based on published accounts available on 
Datastream.  Following Comin and Mulani (2004), the volatility measure used is the standard 
deviation of the growth rate of real sales
(2).  In order to avoid overdue influence from outliers, 
firms exhibiting an annual nominal growth rate above 75%
(3) are excluded from the analysis.  
Ideally to make accurate comparisons nominal sales growth for each firm should be deflated by 
its individual price index.  However, since these data are not available, the nominal sales for each 
firm have been deflated by the aggregate producer price index (PPI).The growth rate of real sales 
are calculated for each company, and the standard deviation of this growth rate is then calculated 
over the previous five and ten years to arrive at the volatility in that year for that firm.   











it s it it x x x σ   
                                                                                                                                                                                            
(1) See Fratantoni and Schuh (2003) for a full description of a heteregenous-agent VAR. 
(2) Unfortunately the coverage of employment data within the data set is insufficient to compute reliable series for 
volatility of workers or sales per worker. CP (2005) find an increase in volatility of employment, whereas Davis et 
al. (2006) find a decrease in volatility of employment across all firms, although an increase within listed firms. 
(3) For example, a merger or large acquisition could skew the results for one firm.  In practice this restriction has 
very little bearing on results.  Indeed even a 50% cut-off barely affects the results presented here.   
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where xit is the growth rate of real sales for company i in year t, and  it x  is the average growth rate 
of real sales for company i over the ten year period to time t.  The five–year measure is computed 
analogously.  The ten–year measure has the advantage of being more likely to encompass a 
complete cycle, while the five–year measure will pick up recent cyclical trends.  Note that this 
measure differs slightly from CM (2004) in the labelling of years.  The volatility measure for the 
ten years 1995–2004 is attributed to 2004 in this paper, whereas CM (2004) label it as 2000. 
The data set used below is drawn from accounts of listed UK companies available on Thomson 
Financial Datastream over the period 1974 — 2004
(4), and has been used in several Bank of 
England Working Papers (see for example Benito (2001) and Bunn and Trivedi (2005)).  It 
covers a longer time period than COMPUSTAT GLOBAL (used by CP (2005)) for the UK, thus 
providing us with more observations to conduct our time series analysis.  The raw data set 
contains roughly 1200 non–financial firms in each year, and includes companies that have 
subsequently been delisted or failed.  The data used below are restricted by the requirement that 
each company must have at least 6 years of observations for sales, the minimum required to 
compute a five–year volatility of real sales growth measure.  
Throughout what follows, reference will be made to two separate samples from the raw data: 
•  Full Sample.  This includes every firm in the raw data set that contains at least six 
consecutive observations, that is at least one observation on volatility.  As such, the 
composition of the panel will change between years as new firms enter and some old firms 
disappear.  For the ten–year volatility measure, which requires 11 consecutive observations, 
there are a total of 1470 firms over the period, representing a total of 13304 firm–year 
observations, an average of over 9 observations per firm.  See Table A1 in the appendix for a 
breakdown by year of the number of firms in the sample for the ten– and five–year measures. 
•  Balanced panel.  This is a panel consisting of the 158 companies that have observations for 
sales in every year from 1974 to 2003, providing 20 volatility observations for each firm.  
2004 was excluded to allow a slightly larger panel. 
4.1 Results for full panel 
Volatility of firm–level sales 
Chart 1 shows the evolution of the mean ten–year volatility of firms in the full sample, both 
unweighted and weighted by sales.  There is an increase in firm–level volatility over the period.  
However, rather than the fairly smooth increase found by CM (2004) for the United States, 
volatility in the United Kingdom is better characterised as hump–shaped.  There is a large 
increase in volatility in the middle of the sample, tailing off to a lower level at the end of the 
period, albeit still higher than at the start.  This is similar to the pattern found by Eberly (2005) 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
(4) A year refers to the accounting year-end.   
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when examining the findings of CP (2005) at a shorter time horizon.  The mean five–year 
volatility of real sales is shown in Chart 2.  Again there is an increase over the period, with a peak 
in volatility in the middle of the sample. 
Chart 1: Mean ten–year volatility of real 
sales growth 
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How sure can we be that this is a secular increase in volatility, and not some function of changes 
in the composition of the sample or other explainable factors? Below we undertake a number of 
robustness checks on the full sample, and Section 4.2 uses a balanced panel to remove any 
influence that changing composition of the panel may have on the final results. 
Distribution of firm–level volatility 
One way to examine the pervasiveness of the increase in volatility is to examine the distribution 
of firm–level volatility throughout the sample (Chart 3).  The results of this exercise are quite 
persuasive.  There has been a slight increase in the 25
th percentile firm’s volatility over the past 
twenty years.  This increase is more marked when the median firm is considered, and even more 
so with the 75
th percentile firm.  Thus the increase in firm–level volatility is widespread, with 
over three quarters of the distribution of firms’ volatility showing an increase in volatility over 
the period, and a noticeable widening of the distribution. 
The volatility measure used above calculates the volatility over time for a particular firm.  A 
further test for the robustness of the increasing trend in volatility it to examine the 
contemporaneous cross–sectional volatility of firms.  Chart 4 shows the standard deviation of the 
growth rate of real sales in each year for all firms in the sample.  This also shows an increasing 
trend over the sample period, so not only is the volatility over time of the average firm increasing, 
but the distribution of firms’ sales growth in any given year has also widened over the period 
1974–2004.   
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Chart 3: Distribution of ten–year volatility 
of real sales growth 
Chart 4: Standard deviation of real sales 
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Estimation results 
CM (2004) carry out a pooled regression to strip out volatility in their sample that can be 
explained by firm characteristics, controlling for the size and age of the firm.  The motivation for 
this is the hypothesis that larger, or more established, firms may be less volatile than newer or 
smaller firms.  Thus younger firms entering towards the end of the sample could be more volatile 
and consequently raise the average volatility of the sample.  Measuring age is difficult in our data 
set, since the only statistic available is the date when the firm entered the sample.  Given that the 
dataset covers listed companies, this may be a result of a stock market listing of an already old 
company.  Consequently, year of entry can at best be used as a control for cohort effects.   
A pooled regression was carried out on the full sample, regressing firm–level ten–year standard 
deviations of real sales growth on a constant, the log of the firm’s real sales and a time trend 
(Regression A in Table 1).  Larger firms were found to be less volatile, and the time trend was 
found to be positive and significant.  However, when the firm’s year of entry into the dataset was 
added to the regression (Regression B), the time trend was no longer significant; instead the year 
of entry was found to explain the rise in firm–level volatility over the sample period. 
This raises an important question regarding the increase in volatility at the level of the firm.  Is it 
caused by all firms in the economy becoming more volatile, or is it because newer firms in the 
economy (as proxied by firms entering the sample later) are more volatile than older firms?  The 
latter case would be interesting of its own right — why are newer firms more volatile at a time 
when the aggregate climate is more stable?  Support for this case is offered by Regression C 
which weights Regression B by the firm’s share in total sales.  This gives smaller weight to the 
newer firms which are typically smaller.  In this regression the trend and year of entry are found 
to be insignificant.   
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Table 1: Regression results from full sample 
Regression   Constant  Log (real sales)  Year of entry  Trend 
Coefficient  94.93** -10.62**    2.559**  A 
Full panel  t–probability  (0.000) (0.001)    (0.012) 
Coefficient  87.51** -9.089**  4.697**  0.707  B 
Full panel  t–probability (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.549) 
Coefficient  57.35** -9.912***  0.548  0.297  C 
Full panel, 
weighted by sales 
t–probability (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.184)  (0.273) 
Coefficient  60.68** -6.381**  0.182  1.679**  D 
Restricted panel  t–probability (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.717)  (0.000) 
Coefficient  48.17** -3.044**  0.031  0.306*  E 
Restricted panel, 
weighted by sales 
t–probability (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.880)  (0.015) 
Coefficient  -75.62** 13.87**    0.764*  F 
Restricted panel, 
Fixed effects 
t–probability (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.020) 
*Significant at 5% level.  **significant at 1% level. 
A further way of disentangling the varying influence of the trend and year of entry on volatility is 
to consider the part of volatility that is unexplained by the above equations.  Chart 5 shows the 
Chart 5: Mean residual firm–level volatility of 














(a) Solid lines show average for all firms 
mean residual ten–year volatility by year of 
entry into the sample in 2003 and 2004.  
This is calculated as the residual volatility 
from subtracting the fitted values from 
Regression A from the actual firm–level 
volatility figure.  Firms that entered the 
sample post–1989 appear more volatile than 
firms that entered the sample earlier.  This 
would lend support to the argument that the 
increase in volatility is caused by new, more 
volatile, firms entering the sample.  However 
one caveat is that these firms have very few 
observations within the sample, so year of 
entry into the sample may dominate any 
effects arising from a long–run increasing trend. 
Furthermore, year of entry is a potentially poor measure of a firm’s age; the firm may have been 
trading for many years before listing.  If this were the case, and there were an upward trend in 
volatility for all firms then a regression may spuriously allocate more weight to year of entry 
rather than to the true trend.  One solution is to place an additional restriction on the sample that   
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firms must have at least five observations for volatility.  This reduces the total number of firms in 
the sample to 955.  The number of firm–year observations falls to 12130, an average of 12.7 
observations per firm.  Regression  B was re–run on this reduced sample (Regression D in Table 
1).  The time trend is now found to be significant and the year of entry insignificant.  This also 
holds true if the regression is weighted by share in sales (Regression E).  However it is important 
to note that the restriction on observations will by definition remove the firms that entered the full 
sample after 1990.   
As a more stringent test of the upward trend in volatility, a fixed effects panel regression was 
carried out on this reduced full sample (regression F).  This includes a firm–specific fixed effects 
dummy for each firm in the sample.  A significant positive trend in volatility was still found to 
hold, although the sign on the log of real sales becomes positive, implying that larger firms are 
more volatile than smaller firms, contrary to the previous results.    
One further way of eliminating any bias arising from changing sample composition is to study the 
evolution of firm–level volatility in a cohort of firms.  The following section studies volatility of 
one such cohort — a balanced panel of all 158 firms in the sample with results in each year over 
the period 1974–2003. 
4.2 Results for balanced panel 
A similar analysis to that above was carried out on a cohort of firms that report results in every 
year 1974–2003.  The advantage of this method is that it strips out any influence of newer firms 
entering the sample.  Thus if an upward trend in volatility is found to hold it will be indicative of 
a trend affecting all firms, rather than a function of changing sample composition.  The 
disadvantage of this method is that it reduces the number and total sales of the firms to around a 
quarter of that of the full sample.  Charts 6 and 7 show the mean volatility of real sales of the 158 
firms in the balanced panel.  Two things are apparent from these charts.  First, there appears to be 
an increase in volatility over the sample period.  Second, the level of volatility is lower for the 
balanced panel than for the full sample reported in Charts 1 and 2.  This could reflect the fact that 
younger firms in the sample are indeed more volatile than older firms.  However, it could also be 
a result of the survivor bias inherent in choosing firms that have remained in the sample 
throughout the period — exiting the sample through bankruptcy is likely to be preceded by a 
period of volatile sales.  
 
To further test whether this increase in volatility is significant, a fixed effect panel regression was 
carried out on the balanced panel.  This regressed the firm–level standard deviations of real sales 
growth on a firm–specific fixed effect term, the log of real sales and a time trend (Table 2).  The 
time trend was found to be positive and significant, even after controlling for fixed effects.  
Therefore the increasing trend in firm–level volatility is not solely a function of changing sample   
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composition, and there is evidence for an increasing trend in volatility independent of the age of 
the firm. 
Chart 6: Mean ten–year volatility of real 
sales growth in balanced panel 
Chart 7: Mean five–year volatility of real 


































Weighted mean - LHS
 
Table 2: Regression results from balanced panel 
  Constant  Log (real sales)  trend 
Coefficient 25.41**  -1.809**  0.0864** 
t–probability (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
**Significant at the 1% level. 
 
From the evidence of the above analysis, there would appear to be a secular increase in firm–
level volatility over the period 1974–2004 in the United Kingdom.  This has been accompanied 
by a widening in the distribution of both firm–level volatility and the cross–sectional distribution 
of real sales growth in each year.  There also exists the possibility that the firms that joined the 
sample in the most recent few years are more volatile than those that joined earlier.  This leads to 
the obvious question of how this greater firm–level volatility results in lower volatility at the 
aggregate level.  The next section uses firm–level data to analyse changes in sectoral volatility to 
see whether this may account for changes in aggregate volatility.   
 
5 Volatility of real firm–level sales growth relative to sector 
One explanation offered for the Great Stability is that of structural change — the more stable 
service sector becoming increasingly important in aggregate GDP compared to the more volatile 
manufacturing sector.  If firms in different sectors exhibit differing volatilities then the results of 
the previous section may be affected by sectoral effects.  That is, if the changing composition of 
the sample changes the relative weight of sectors in the sample there may be an observed increase 
in volatility even if there is no change in volatility at the sectoral level.  This section examines 
sector effects using firm–level data to see whether there is any evidence of this.  There is a further   
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motivation for assessing the change in volatility at the sectoral level.  Previous studies (i.e.  
Eberly (2005) and Davis et al.  (2006)) have pointed to the possibility of selection bias in using 
only listed firms.  If the panel of firms used in this paper is to be taken as indicative of all firms in 
the economy then it also needs to explain the simultaneous small fall in sectoral volatility in the 
United Kingdom over the period. 
The firms in the sample can be divided into nine broad sectors,
(5) although in practice there are 
very few firms in the Agriculture, fishing and forestry and Electricity, gas and water supply 
sectors.  When the median volatility of real sales for firms within each sector is computed (Chart 
8) the upward trend in individual firm’s volatility is apparent, so changing sectoral composition 
within the sample is not the cause of the increasing trend in firm–level volatility in the full 
sample. 
We also analyse real sales growth volatility at the sectoral level.  For each of the nine sectors, this 
is calculated as the sum of the growth rates of sales of all firms in the sector, weighted by the 
firm’s sales.  The ten–year standard deviation of the sectoral growth rate can then be calculated 
by the same method used previously.  The results for a few selected sectors are shown in Chart 9.  
Although there is evidence of a peak in volatility in the middle of the sample period, the general 
trend for most sectors is downwards.  Thus, the trend at the sectoral level is similar to that at the 
aggregate level. 
Chart 8: Median firm–level ten–year 
volatility of real sales growth, by industry 





























If the variance of firm–level volatility is increasing in each sector, then it follows that in order for 
the sector as a whole to demonstrate falling volatility the growth rates of firms within a sector 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
(5) Agriculture, fishing and forestry; Mining, quarrying and oil; Manufacturing; Electricity, gas and water supply; 
Construction; Wholesale and retail trade; Hotels and restaurants; Transport, storage and communications; Other 
services   
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must be diverging.  That is, the covariance of sales growth between firms must be falling.  
Calculating the covariance of growth rates of a large number of firms is a computationally 
intensive exercise.  A simpler method is to calculate the divergence of firms’ growth rates from 
the sector average.  The closer the individual firms’ growth rates are to the sector average, the 
greater the covariance between them.  We calculate a measure of divergence from the sector as 
the deviation of a firm’s growth rate from the sector’s mean, rather than from its own mean 
growth rate over the ten previous years.  This measure also appeals since by subtracting the sector 
mean growth rate it is robust to any bias arising from the unobserved true sector price index. 
More formally; for each firm i we have: 
∑
=
− − − =
9
0
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Where xijt is the growth rate of real sales for company i which is in sector j in year t, and  jt x  is 
the weighted average growth rate of real sales across all firms in sector j at time t.  An aggregate 
weighted mean can be constructed for this measure by weighting the individual firm’s measure 
















Chart 10: Sector–adjusted real sales growth 
volatility 
Chart 10 shows the evolution of the ten–year 
















relative to sector for the whole sample, 
weighted by real sales.  On both measures, 
there is a clear increase in firm–level 
volatility.  If firms’ real sales growth rates 
are diverging more from the sector average, 
it implies that the covariance between firms’ 
growth rates in each sector is falling.  This is 
a potential explanation of the divergence of 
trends in aggregate and firm–level volatility 
— less correlated firm–level results within 
sectors leading to greater aggregate stability. 
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Increased competition within sectors 
One explanation of an increased volatility of firms’ sales growth relative to sector could be an 
increase in product market competition.  We consider here two possible measures of product 
market competition — turnover of leader firms and margins. CP (2005) attribute some of the rise 
in firm–level volatility to an increase in turnover of the composition of leading firms within an 
industry.  
We define turnover of leader firms in industry j at time t as the probability of a firm leaving the 
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where yijt is the sales of firm i in sector j at time t, 
j top
t y
, is the 80
th percentile of the distribution of 
sales at time t for all firms in sector j.  A ten–year figure can be computed analogously.  Chart 11 
shows the average turnover for leader firms across all industries in the sample.  Both measures 
have increased markedly over the past decade. 
A further way of investigating trends in competition is to study profit margins of firms within 
sectors.  We calculate the operating profit margin, defined as the ratio of operating income over 
sales for each firm in the sample.  Chart 12 shows the average operating profit margin for firms 
over the sample period, either unweighted or weighted by sales.  This latter measure is equivalent 
to the operating profit margin of the whole sample. 






















The stability of the weighted series reflects the fact that the largest firms in the sample continue 
to be as profitable as at the start of the sample.  However, the fall in the unweighted series reflects 
the higher probability of firms leaving the top quintile of sales, and a great influx of new entrants,   
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which have lower profit margins.  Both the increased turnover of market leaders, and the 
divergence of profit margins between these leaders and the rest of the firms in the sample accord 
with the findings of CP (2005).  It suggests a higher level of competition within sectors which 
may lie behind the increasing firm–level volatility.  That aggregate margins have not declined 
with increased competition is a result of the fact that the largest firms within sectors have 
maintained the same level of margins, although the composition of that group of firms is 
becoming more changeable. 
6 Decomposition of aggregate volatility 
So far we have analysed the volatility of sales growth at the firm and sectoral level.  CP (2005) 
also carry out a decomposition of the variance of aggregate GDP and find that the fall in 
aggregate variance of GDP in the US is attributable chiefly to a fall in the comovement between 
sectors, rather than a fall in the variance of sectors themselves.   This is similar to the results 
found above, that a decline in sectoral volatility was caused by a fall in the comovement of firms’ 
real sales growth which counteracted the rise in firm–level volatility. 
This section uses ONS National Accounts data for 31 sectors (plus the adjustment for financial 
intermediation services indirectly measured) over the period 1978–2004 to verify whether a fall 
in covariance between sectors is also the main contributing factor to the fall in aggregate value 
added volatility in the UK.  Sectoral growth rates are derived from the volume index for value 
added for each sector.  The aggregate growth rate is constructed by the weighted growth rate of 
the sectors and differs slightly from the published rate (see Table A2 and Charts A1 and A2 in the 
appendix).  Weights are derived using the 2002 weights published by the ONS, and the implied 
weights using sector growth rates from the volume indices. 
Let  t s, γ  be the growth rate of value added of sector s in time t.  Let  t s, ω  be the share of value 
added of sector s in aggregate value added.  Also let  [ ] ( )
t
t T Z M 9 −  denote the mean of {Zt-9, Zt-8, ...,  
Zt},  [] ( )
t
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Using the definition of the variance: 
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It follows that the aggregate variance can be rewritten as:   
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The first component is the sum of the variances of the growth in value added at the sector level.  
The second is the covariance between the growth rates of value added of the individual sectors.  
The other terms relate to the effects of changing weights within the ten year period of the 
variance.  In practice, these terms are in general small, and have little impact on the results of the 
decomposition. 
Chart 13 shows the results of the decomposition of the volatility of aggregate gross value added.  
While there has been a small reduction in the variance of individual sectors, the main driver of 
the fall in aggregate volatility has been the fall in the covariance between sectors.  Indeed the fall 
in covariance accounts for 78% of the fall in aggregate variance over the period, compared with 
the 11% accounted for by the fall in sectoral variances. 
Chart 14 shows a counterfactual experiment that uses the actual growth rate of sectors, but fixes 
the weight of sectors in aggregate value added to their 2002 values.  The results remain 
essentially unchanged — that it is the fall in the covariance between sectors that lies behind the 
Great Stability in the UK rather than changing weights of sectors, or changes in volatility of 
individual sectors. 
 
Chart 13: Decomposition of aggregate 
volatility (changing weights) 
Chart 14: Decomposition of aggregate 
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7 .  Discussion of results 
The previous sections of data analysis has provided some useful stylised facts of the evolution of 
firms and sectors over the past few decades in the United Kingdom.  Specifically, in a period of   
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declining aggregate volatility sectors have become marginally less volatile individually, but have 
become markedly decoupled from each other.  At the same time, individual firms have become 
more volatile overall, and potentially newer firms that have become listed over the period of 
greater stability in the economy are more volatile than older firms.  Concurrently, the 
performance of firms within sectors has become more divergent.  How can the above analysis 
help differentiate between potential causes of the Great Stability? 
Sectoral change 
To what extent has the shift from manufacturing to services in the UK contributed to the fall in 
output volatility? The answer would appear to be: very little.  Evidence from firm–level data 
suggests that sectors have witnessed an increase in firm–level volatility, and sectors themselves 
have exhibited falling volatility.  Using national accounts data and fixing the weights of the 
sectors in the economy gives a very similar picture to that using moving weights.  Hence the 
change in relative weight of manufacturing and services within the economy does not appear to 
have been the major cause of the fall in aggregate volatility.   
Increased product market competition 
Philippon (2003) constructs a model to test whether an increase in competition in product markets 
can explain the divergence in aggregate and firm–level productivity.  According to this model, in 
a competitive environment it is more costly for firms to deviate from the optimal price.  It follows 
that firm–level sales growth may be more volatile, and price changes more frequent, with higher 
competition.
(6)  However, this increased flexibility enables the economy to react better to shocks, 
thus reducing aggregate volatility.  Philippon calibrates the model for the volatility in firm–level 
output during the period 1965–1980, then increases competitive pressures in the economy such 
that the volatility of output of firms matches that in the period 1981–2001.  Phillipon finds that 
this can explain 40 per cent of the reduction in the volatility of GDP.  This accords with the 
findings of this paper.  The evidence presented above suggests that competition has become 
stronger over the sample period. 
Globalisation 
Similar to an increase in product–market flexibility arising from higher domestic competition 
would be an increase in competition from global competitors.  At the firm–level this may lead to 
a divergence of results between those firms that are directly exposed to international competition 
and those that are not, or indeed those firms that are active internationally and those firms that 
rely on the domestic market.  At the sectoral level, some sectors could become more dependent 
on world–wide conjunctural developments and hence less aligned with domestic events.  This 
could explain the fall in covariance between the sectors in the UK.  This argument also appeals 
insofar as it would also hold symmetrically and help explain the fall in output volatility across the   
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industrial world. One interesting line of future research would be to measure the correlation of 
growth rates of industries across countries. 
Globalisation could also work at the firm level by removing national barriers, allowing previously 
disparate domestic markets to integrate thereby increasing market size.  According to Asplund 
and Nocke (2006), larger markets are endogenously more competitive, with price–cost margins 
smaller.  As a result, idiosyncratic shocks are more likely to cause firms to leave the market, 
increasing the turnover of firms within the market. 
Economic diversification 
Acemoglu (2005) (in comments on CP (2005)) presents a model that looks at financial 
development and economic growth.  As economies grow and the financial sector becomes 
deeper, firms are better able to borrow to finance risky projects.  As a result, the firm–level 
volatility increases since firms are undertaking riskier projects.  Simultaneously, as the economy 
becomes more diversified, the aggregate shocks become less prevalent since the covariance 
between firms falls.  This leads to lower aggregate volatility.   
The 1980s witnessed a large–scale deregulation of the financial markets in many countries, of 
which the United Kingdom was no exception.  If this resulted in more capital available for riskier 
projects then existing firms may have decided to obtain finance for such projects.  This would fit 
with the increased volatility of firms in the balanced panel. It also follows that firms undertaking 
riskier business may have been able to issue equity publicly at better terms, encouraging stock–
market listings of riskier firms.  If this were true then firms listing post–deregulation could be 
more volatile than those before deregulation.  Given that the firm–level dataset used in this paper 
is of listed companies it may explain why firms that enter at the very end of the sample may 
appear more volatile. However, there may be other explanations and more data, notably of 
unlisted companies, is required before any firm conclusions could be reached. 
Good policy or good luck? 
The three previous candidate explanations all rely on a change in economic policy (product 
liberalisation, deregulation etc.).  As such, any benefits arising can be considered as the result of 
‘good policy’.  However the debate usually centres on the effects of improved macroeconomic 
stabilisation in the form of better monetary policy.  Can the data differentiate between good 
monetary policy and good luck? Suppose sectoral growth rates are composed of three terms — a 
trend, a common demand shock affecting all sectors and an orthogonal idiosyncratic shock.  If 
monetary policy becomes effective at counteracting the common shock then sector growth rates 
will chiefly be composed of the idiosyncratic shock.  Since these by definition have no 
covariance with the idiosyncratic shocks of other sectors, the aggregate covariance, and thus 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
(6) This is supported by surveys of firms’ price–setting behaviour, e.g.  Hall et al.  (1997) for the United Kingdom.   
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aggregate variance, will fall.  This would certainly fit with the facts presented above that the 
covariance between sectoral growth rates has fallen.  In practice it is difficult to differentiate ex 
post between smaller aggregate shocks to the economy and policy better able to counteract the 
aggregate shocks.  What is clear from the data is that any good luck has been confined to smaller 
aggregate shocks, since the reduction in sectoral volatility accounts for little of the fall in 
aggregate volatility. 
8.  Conclusions 
Previous research has highlighted a divergence in the trends of volatility of output at the 
aggregate and at the firm level in the United States.  This paper uses firm–level data to investigate 
whether these divergent trends were also apparent in the United Kingdom.  It finds evidence of an 
increasing trend of volatility at the firm level, reinforced by a widening of the distribution of the 
volatility of firm–level sales growth both over time and cross–sectionally.  Analysis of a balanced 
panel of firms with accounts throughout the period suggests that this trend is not a function of the 
changing composition of firms in the sample, although there is evidence that firms that entered 
the sample post–1989 are more volatile than firms that entered earlier.   
Within sectors, the sales growth performance of firms has become more divergent.  This falling 
covariance results in a slight decline in the volatility of sectors, and gives insights into the 
mechanisms whereby aggregate volatility has fallen.   This paper also carried out a 
decomposition of the variance of aggregate value added using UK national accounts data for 31 
sectors.  It finds that the principal driver of the fall in volatility at the aggregate level has been the 
fall in the covariance between the growth rates of the sectors in the economy, rather than the fall 
in the volatility of the sectors themselves. 
Understanding the cause of the increasing volatility at the firm level and the decoupling of sectors 
at the aggregate level may well be crucial in discriminating between competing theories of the 
causes of the Great Stability, and have important implications for policy makers.  The greater 
volatility at the firm level, together with a greater divergence of firms within each sector may 
well be indicative of increased competition.  This in turn will have implications for firms’ wage– 
and price–setting behaviour, with consequent effects on the transmission of both shocks and 
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Table A1: Number of firms in panel, by year 
Year 
Number of firms — 
ten–year volatility 
Number of firms — 
five–year volatility 
Number of firms with five 
observations for volatility 
1980   1191   
1981   1150   
1982   1075   
1983   1026   
1984  917 956  652 
1985  853 896  656 
1986  767 822  646 
1987  700 756  634 
1988  650 726  634 
1989  629 719  621 
1990  618 738  613 
1991  588 741  585 
1992  597 774  584 
1993  592 803  576 
1994  609 833  587 
1995  632 877  598 
1996  646 876  599 
1997  662 853  595 
1998  643 787  588 
1999  621 714  571 
2000  559 663  530 
2001  528 653  502 
2002  513 698  487 
2003  496 718  458 
2004  484 707  414 
      
Firm–years 13304  20752  12130 
Number of firms  1470  2178  955   
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Table A2: Constructed weights of sectors in aggregate value added 
Sectoral weights 1978  2004 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing  11.1  9.9 
Mining of coal  5.3  0.6 
Extraction of mineral oil and natural gas  13.4  22.3 
Other mining and quarrying  2.9  1.6 
Food, beverages and tobacco  31.7  22.6 
Textiles and textile products  18.3  5.5 
Leather and leather products  2.7  0.6 
Wood and wood products  4.9  2.7 
Pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing  27.0  21.9 
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel  4.5  2.6 
Chemicals  15.0  17.4 
Rubber and plastic  9.3  8.5 
Other non–metallic mineral products  10.4  5.7 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products  32.3  16.1 
Machinery  28.9  13.0 
Electrical equipment  13.1  18.1 
Transport equipment  25.6  17.2 
Other manufacturing  16.4  7.1 
Electricity, gas and water supply  16.7  17.7 
Total production  278.9  201.1 
Construction  64.2  58.9 
Wholesale and retail  101.0  123.6 
Hotels and restaurants  38.4  33.5 
Transport and storage  43.8  48.4 
Communication  11.6  31.5 
Financial intermediation  55.9  68.0 
Letting of dwellings and imputed rent  94.2  78.0 
Other real estate, renting and business activities  72.3  162.2 
Education  72.6  59.5 
Health and social work  55.2  62.3 
Other services  35.2  52.0 
Public administration and defence  86.2  55.6 
Total services  666.4  777.4 
Adjustment for FISIM  -20.5  -44.3 
All industries  1000.0 1000.0 
    
Chart A1: True (ONS) and constructed 
aggregate growth rate 
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